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Die Beschäftigung und Neueinstellung älterer 
Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland: Eine vergleichende 
Perspektive
Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt einen 
Überblick über den Arbeitsmarkt für ältere Arbeitnehmer 
in Deutschland. Der besondere Fokus liegt dabei auf 
einer international vergleichenden Perspektive sowie auf 
den Bedingungen, die die Entscheidungen von Arbeit-
gebern beeinflussen, ältere Arbeitnehmer zu beschäftigen 
und neu einzustellen. Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen 
ist, dass Ältere, die arbeitslos werden, nach wie vor 
geringe Chancen haben, eine neue Stelle zu finden. Nahe-
liegende Erklärungen könnten sein, dass dies mit einer 
geringeren Produktivität oder auch mit Diskriminierung 
zusammenhängt. Vorliegende empirische Studien liefern 
hier jedoch eher gemischte Ergebnisse. Eine alternative 
Erklärung besteht darin, dass vielmehr die Anreize, die 
Arbeitgeber einsetzen, um Mitarbeiter zur Leistungser-
bringungen zu motivieren, eine wichtige Rolle spielen. 
Ein Weg zur Motivation von Mitarbeitern ist der Einsatz 
von Formen zeitlich verzögerter Vergütung (Hutchens, J 
Lab Econ, 4, 439–457, 1986; Lazear, J Polit Economy, 
87, 1261–1284, 1979). Zeitlich verzögerte Vergütung 
eignet sich jedoch nicht, neu eingestellte Arbeitnehmer zu 
motivieren, die nur über einen kürzeren erwarteten Be-
schäftigungshorizont verfügen. Daher präferieren Arbeit-
geber, die dieses Motivationsinstrument nutzen, bei Neu-
einstellungen tendenziell eher jüngere und keine älteren 
Bewerber. Wir verweisen darauf, dass es jedoch als eher 
zweifelhaft erscheint, die Arbeitsmarktchancen Älterer 
dadurch verbessern zu wollen, indem man Arbeitgeber 
zur Abschaffung zeitlich verzögerter Vergütungsformen 
bewegt. So zeigt die japanische Erfahrung, dass sich die 
Arbeitsmarktchancen Älterer bei geeigneter Ausgestaltung 
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auch im Fall einer intensiven Nutzung zeitlich verzögerter 
Entlohnung verbessern.
1  Introduction
Studies on older workers often focus on the incentives to 
retire. Typically the roles of working conditions, health 
problems and institutional factors (specifically early retire-
ment possibilities) are considered (e.g., Coppola and Wilke 
2014; Ebbinghaus and Hofaecker 2013; Roberts and Jones 
2014; Schnalzenberger et al. 2014). However a deeper 
understanding of the labor market for older workers can 
only be obtained if we also take into account the person-
nel policy of firms and the resulting employment and hiring 
strategies.
In what follows, we highlight the labor market situation 
of older workers in Germany. We argue that while institu-
tional reforms have improved their labor force participation, 
serious problems remain. The market is simply not dynamic 
and older workers once out of work are likely to remain 
so for a long time and may well exit not into employment 
but into retirement. Moreover, when they do re-enter to find 
jobs, they are often not able to get career jobs or full time 
jobs.
We follow this demonstration with a series of potential 
explanations for the limited employment opportunities for 
older workers. We first consider that older workers are poor 
hires because their productivity is substantially lower on 
average. We next consider that biases or poor information 
causes employers to simply discriminate against older job 
seekers. While we do not rule these out as partial explana-
tions, we do suggest that the evidence is not overwhelming 
and that it seems unlikely these are complete explanations.
We highlight the importance of life-cycle motivational 
models which involve employers deferring compensation. 
These models imply tenure earnings slopes that are steeper 
than productivity increases as firms cause workers to post 
a quasi-bond that is repaid only later in tenure and depen-
dent upon sufficient effort. In essence, the bond increases 
the cost of job loss and so creates effort incentives. The fact 
that workers are paid far more than their productivity late in 
their tenure makes mandatory retirement a frequent feature 
of deferred compensation. While this might create life-cycle 
efficiencies by increasing motivation, it creates difficulties 
for those older workers trying to re-enter employment. They 
cannot be motivated by life-cycle profiles and they cannot 
be paid the same as others with their experience receiving 
wages above productivity because of such profiles. The con-
sequence seems often to simply not hire older workers or to 
relegate them to non-career and part time jobs.
We imagine potential policy responses both in the abstract, 
using Japan as an example, and within the constraints of 
German institutions. We remain modestly pessimistic that 
substantial improvements can be achieved without harm-
ing the efficiencies associated with deferred compensation 
but try to outline possible avenues. We emphasize that the 
current use of deferred compensation is integrated into an 
interlocking set of German institutions that appear to add to 
productivity and this would be at risk if deferred compensa-
tion were reduced or eliminated.
2  The labor market situation of older workers in 
Germany
2.1  Increasing the labor force participation rate of older 
workers
Compared with workers in many other countries, those in 
Germany retain a generous pay-as-you-go public pension 
scheme with high effective replacement rates and rela-
tively low retirement ages. Yet, recent reforms, while not 
unidirectional, have done much to change the incentives of 
older workers. These changes, together with increased labor 
market participation of women (Dietz and Walwei 2011), 
appear to have resulted in longer work lives and the better 
integration of older German workers (Dlugosz et al. 2013; 
OECD 2010).
As Germany faces a particularly large decline in its 
natural working-age population, improving the labor mar-
ket integration of older workers has naturally become a 
priority. German fertility rates remain low and there is no 
expectation that they will increase substantially (Hoehn 
et al. 2008). Moreover, life expectancy has risen continu-
ously and this trend is expected to continue at least over the 
next generation (Bonin 2009). As a consequence, Boersch-
Supan and Wilke (2006) show projections that the ratio of 
the population age 65 or older to the population 15–64 will 
rise to 0.43 by 2030. Projections such as this, combined 
with early retirement ages and generous benefits led to a 
series of reforms designed to make the pension system 
more sustainable.
The age of retirement has been increased and will reach 
67 by 2029. The payouts have also been made more actuari-
ally fair to reduce the incentive to retire early. Yet, discus-
sion continues about steps that should be taken to reduce 
strategic behavior to circumvent early retirement penalties 
through disability. Moreover, very recent changes have 
moved the opposite direction with the ability for those who 
have 45 years of paying into the system to retire as early 
as 63. Despite the on-going changes and debates, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the balance of the reforms is 
making a difference. Over the course of the decade the labor 
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ticipate than women in the US and Japan, this is not true of 
older women.
Second, positive developments must be qualified by 
the relatively intense use of partial retirement in Germany 
(Altersteilzeit). Most on partial retirement use the “block 
model” in which a period of full-time work is followed by a 
period of not working (Wanger 2009). This part-time work 
is somewhat misleadingly identified as employment both 
during periods when working and when not working. Thus, 
official statistics overestimate the number of older workers 
actually working at any point in time.
Third, and in many ways the most dramatic, unem-
ployed older workers continue to face severe difficulties 
in finding a new job. The difficulties result in higher long-
term unemployment for older workers in much of Europe 
(OECD 2010). This also holds for Germany. In 2012, 47 % 
of unemployed persons of the age group 55–64 were long-
term unemployed compared to 36 % across all age groups 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013). Unemployed persons 
age 55–64 who found a new job in 2012 had on average 
an unemployment duration of 56.1 weeks. This is nearly 20 
weeks more than the average of 36.6 weeks across all age 
groups. Moreover, the higher unemployment substantially 
underestimates the difficulty as many older workers simply 
retire after an unsuccessful job search.
These additional difficulties in finding a new job become 
clear if one considers German labor market flows, the entries 
and exits from employment and, specifically, the transi-
tion from unemployment to employment for different age 
groups. The relative entry rate of older workers to employ-
ment compared to that of younger workers has simply not 
force participation rate of those between ages 55 and 64 has 
shown a strong and steady increase.1
2.2  Has the labor market situation of older workers really 
improved?
Even though the employment situation of older workers 
in Germany has improved, very substantial issues remain. 
First, while the labor market participation of older workers 
has increased, their labor market participation remains far 
below the employment ratios of other age groups. Moreover, 
it drops very quickly with advancing age. These points are 
illustrated in a comparison across four countries in Fig. 1. 
At age 55–59 the participation rate of Germany equals that 
of Japan and the US while being above that of France. With 
advancing age the German rate drops well below that of 
Japan and the US while approaching that of France. Making 
the same comparison for men shows that German participa-
tion rate exceeds that of the US in the youngest age cohort 
and then falls well below with advancing age (see Fig. 2). 
Limiting the comparison to women shows that both Euro-
pean countries actually start above Japan and the US but 
then drop substantially below as age increases (see Fig. 3). 
The drop for women is particularly interesting as until about 
the year of 2000, the LFPR for women aged 25–54 in the 
US was higher than in Germany but this has since reversed. 
Thus, while most women in Germany are more likely to par-
1 Brenke and Zimmermann (2011) argue that rising educational levels 
of older workers have also contributed to their increase in the labor 
force participation.
Fig. 1 LFPR by Age across Coun-
tries. (Source: OECD StatEx-
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unsubsidized employment in 2010. This fell to only 2.1 % 
for those 60 years of age or older (Dietz and Walwei 2011). 
Thus, one view of the recent reforms is that while they have 
improved the probability that firms retain older workers, 
they have not improved the probability that they hire older 
workers. The reasons behind this continued pattern will be a 
major focus of our review.
Adding to the difficulties, the earnings loss after non-
employment is larger for older workers. Examining Ger-
man administrative data, Zwick (2012a) shows that while 
younger workers quickly catch-up to the earnings of those 
without a non-employment spell, many older workers never 
changed (Dietz and Walwei 2011). Table 1 highlights this 
point by showing that the entry rate of workers declines 
with age and, for example, those 55–59 have an entry rate 
only 1/3 that of those less than 50. Moreover, as the Table 
makes clear the entry rates for older workers (indeed, all 
workers) have been unchanged over the period from 2002 to 
2010. Thus, the increased labor force participation seen for 
older workers comes exclusively from the employed exit-
ing employment less frequently and simply retaining their 
jobs for longer. The re-employment probabilities for older 
workers have not improved. Thus, only 3.9 % of the stock 
of older unemployed workers (age 50 or older) moved into 
Fig. 2 LFPR by Age across 
Countries (Men). (Source: 
OECD StatExtracts, “Labor 




Fig. 3 LFPR by Age across 
Countries (Women). (Source: 
OECD StatExtracts, “Labor 
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lemand and Rycx (2009) present contrasting evidence from 
Belgium that firm productivity increases with the share of 
young workers (relative to middle aged) and decreases with 
the share of old workers (again relative to middle aged). Tip-
per (2012) presents evidence from New Zealand in which 
the age structure of workforce simply plays no role. In short, 
these studies provide no clear evidence on the relationship 
between workers’ age and productivity.
This lack of clear evidence on the role of workforce age 
also holds true for Germany. Schneider (2007) examines 
age-productivity profiles for firms in the manufacturing and 
in the service sector. OLS regressions suggest an inverse 
u-shaped profile in the manufacturing sector and a nega-
tive profile in the service sector. The age effects disappear 
completely in fixed effects estimates. Goebel and Zwick 
(2012) also find no significant age-productivity profiles 
once the endogeneity of the age structure of the workforce is 
taken into account by GMM estimates. Pfeifer and Wagner 
(2014a) obtain for manufacturing firms a positive concave 
age-productivity profile. Productivity increases until age 30 
and does not significantly change afterwards. This result 
holds in both OLS and GMM estimates.
Such findings give rise to the question why the share of 
older workers has no clear negative effect on productivity 
despite the potentially lower physical and mental fitness of 
the aged. One explanation is that the lower fitness of older 
workers is offset by their greater experience. Boersch-Supan 
and Weiss (2007) support this view in their examination of 
the performance of work teams in a truck assembly plant of 
the German car manufacturer Daimler AG. While the quan-
tity of output is determined by the speed of the assembly 
line, the quality of output depends on the production errors 
of a work team. Using average job tenure within a team as 
a proxy for experience, Boersch-Supan and Weiss examine 
age-productivity profiles with and without controlling for 
job tenure. If average job tenure is included in the regres-
sion, the share of older workers within a team is associated 
with increased production errors. This can be interpreted as 
a “pure age effect”. By contrast, if average job tenure is not 
controlled for, the share of older workers is no longer asso-
ciated with the production errors of a team. The share of 
older workers now captures not only the “pure age effect” 
but also an offsetting positive “experience effect.”
3.2  Age diversity
Nonetheless the case study evidence of the truck assembly 
plant also shows that even if age per se has no influence on 
productivity, age diversity within the work teams can play 
a role. While the average age of workers within a team has 
no significant effect on production errors, age diversity of 
team members is associated with increased errors (Boersch-
Supan et al. 2006). Evidence from Belgium also suggests 
do. Older workers with a non-employment spell suffer a 
10 % earnings disadvantage 1 year after returning to work 
and a nontrivial earnings disadvantage remains even 6 years 
after returning to work.
Related to each of the last two points, many older Ger-
man workers may be able to only find part-time work after 
a non-employment spell. While this may be the desired out-
come for some workers, in the U.S. and U.K. a substantial 
portion of older workers report involuntary part-time status 
(Bell and Rutherford 2013; Reynolds and Wenger 2010). 
Among German employers, Heywood et al. (2011) present 
evidence that a sizeable proportion of those who would not 
hire older workers for full time jobs, indicate they will do so 
for part-time jobs. Thus, older workers seeking re-employ-
ment face diminished odds of finding work and when they 
do find work it provides lower wages and it may also pro-
vide fewer hours than they desire. In sum, it appears clear 
that, once separated, older workers have trouble reconnect-
ing with career jobs. In what follows, we consider potential 
explanations for this pattern.
3  Older workers and productivity
3.1  Age-productivity profiles
One reason for the poor labor market opportunities of older 
workers could be that they simply have a lower productiv-
ity. Studies in occupational medicine, cognitive psychology 
and gerontology suggest that physical and some dimen-
sions of mental fitness deteriorate from age 25 onwards (see 
Boersch-Supan et al. 2005; Skirbekk 2004; 2008; van Ours 
2009 for surveys). Given this background, a series of econo-
metric studies examine whether or not the age structure of 
the workforce has an influence on the productivity of firms. 
Using data from Taiwan, Liu et al. (2009) present evidence 
that firms with high shares of middle age workers are the 
most productive. This contrasts with evidence from Austria 
in which firms with young workers are the least productive 
but in which older age workers generate no decline (Mahl-
berg et al. 2013). This evidence is similar to that from France 
in which Aubert and Crepon (2007) show that workers less 
than age 40 contribute less to firm productivity but that 
there is no difference in contributions by age above 40. Lal-
Table 1 German yearly job entries as a percent of age group employ-
ment





IAB Research Unit A1 as calculated by Dietz and Walwei (2011, 
p. 369)
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do not obtain significant results. Backes-Gellner and Veen 
(2013) find that while age diversity in general is negatively 
associated with productivity, it has a positive interaction 
effect with innovativeness on productivity.
In the end it strikes us that the unsettled evidence on the role 
of worker age on firm productivity and the relatively small 
magnitudes of even those that find older workers detrimental 
are insufficient to generate the extremely difficult hiring situa-
tion that characterizes older workers.2 At a basic level, if older 
workers were slightly less productive, one would anticipate 
wage offers to adjust but not to see the widespread absence 
of hiring older workers. We now consider other alternatives.
4  Discrimination
Discrimination may be a critical reason for the poor labor 
market prospects of older workers. Buesch et al. (2009) 
provide a questionnaire study for Norway and Germany 
to examine if applicants with the same qualifications but 
with different ages are treated differently in notional hir-
ing decisions. In the study, students and personnel managers 
received a description of an age neutral job and the CVs of 
hypothetical applicants. They had to fill in a questionnaire 
and to decide the applicant they would hire. The results of 
the study suggest that age discrimination plays a role in the 
hiring decisions in both countries with the age discrimina-
tion being more pronounced in Germany. An age differen-
tial of 14 years reduces the hiring probability of otherwise 
equal applicants by 22 percentage points in Germany and by 
12 percentage points in Norway. The propensity to discrimi-
nate does not appear to differ between students and manag-
ers and does not depend on the age of the decision maker.
Correspondence studies in which pairs of fictitious appli-
cations are sent to actual employers are common in other 
countries. The applications submitted strive to be identical 
in all dimensions other than age. The critical issue is whether 
or not the employers are more likely to contact and pursue 
(seek an interview for example) the applications associated 
with the younger workers. Using such applications, Riach 
and Rich have confirmed statistically significant prefer-
ences by employers for younger workers in England (2010), 
France (2007) and Spain (2006). Such studies appear to 
have largely replaced earlier audit studies that used actual 
subjects (actors in essence) of different ages to pursue jobs 
(see Bendick et al. 1999).3
2 We recognize that measurement problems and high levels of aggrega-
tion potentially limit studies on age structure and productivity. These 
limits are far less severe in studies such as Boersch-Supan and Weiss 
(2007) that use insider econometrics.
3 See Riach and Rich (2002) for a review of the early field experiments 
on discrimination and Neumark (2010) for a methodology to improve 
the estimates that emerge from such audits and correspondence studies.
that age diversity is negatively associated with productivity 
(Garnero et al. 2014). This indicates that age diversity leads 
to more conflicts and communication difficulties within 
teams. To the extent that such results are general they would 
apparently argue for hiring a single cohort of workers and 
retaining them as they age.
However, the evidence on the productivity effects of 
age diversity is also mixed. Backes-Gellner et al. (2011) 
examine age-diverse workforces in German labor courts 
and find that a more diverse workforce results in higher 
organizational performance. They argue that an age-diverse 
workforce is better able to serve multiple performance 
dimensions. Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) also find 
a positive link between age diversity and productivity for 
Finland while Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen (2008) find a 
middle level of age dispersion leads to the highest produc-
tivity in Denmark.
3.3  Are there moderating factors?
The mixed results obtained by econometric studies indi-
cate that there exists no easy uniform relationship between 
the age structure of the workforce and the productivity of 
a firm. The effect of the age structure may depend on cir-
cumstances and the type of firm. Goebel and Zwick (2013) 
obtain evidence that age-productivity profiles depend on 
specific human resource measures for older employees. 
They find that the relative productivity contribution of older 
workers is higher if firms provide specific equipment, create 
age-specific jobs or implement mixed-age working teams. 
Working time reductions and specific training do not appear 
to be associated with a higher productivity of older workers.
Moreover, the technology and innovativeness of a firm 
might play a moderating role as they influence skill require-
ments. There appears to be a wide held view among German 
managers that older workers are less flexible to cope with 
organizational and technological change (Koller and Gru-
ber 2001). This view appears to be confirmed by a study by 
Schleife (2006). She finds that older workers are less likely 
to use computers. Relatedly, Pfeifer and Wagner (2014b) 
obtain the result that firms with a higher share of older work-
ers employ a lower share of R&D employees. However, 
from a theoretical viewpoint the link between older workers 
and technological change is not that clear. The experience of 
older workers may be valuable for a successful implementa-
tion of technological changes. Other studies for Germany do 
indeed provide little evidence that older workers harm tech-
nological change. Bertschek and Meyer (2009) find a posi-
tive relationship between IT intensity and productivity that 
is not affected by the proportion of older workers. Frosch 
et al. (2011) examine if staffing strategies characterized by 
rejuvenation of the workforce and increasing age diversity 
have an influence on the innovation success of firms. They 
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job. However, those older workers who are unemployed 
are more likely to be unemployed because they are unpro-
ductive. As a consequence, there is a negative association 
between the age and the expected productivity of an unem-
ployed worker. In this setting, firms have an incentive to 
statistically discriminate against older unemployed workers 
in the hiring decision.
Altogether, it seems plausible that some of the reluctance 
to hire older workers may be a combination of preference 
based discrimination and statistical discrimination as out-
lined above. Less clear is why such discrimination does not 
seem to permeate other aspects of the employment rela-
tion to the same extent. There is far less evidence that older 
workers are penalized in earnings or assignments within the 
firm. To the contrary the historic concern is that older work-
ers have levels of pay that exceed their productivity. Thus, 
it has been three and half decades since Medoff and Abra-
ham (1980) noted that pay often increases with age (tenure 
within the firm) even as productivity does not.
5  Deferred compensation
An alternative explanation, beyond productivity and dis-
crimination, for the difficulties of older job seekers comes 
from the theory of delayed compensation. Under this theory 
the payment schemes designed to align incentives over a 
work life within firms may cause poor labor market pros-
pects for older workers who apply for jobs. Even in the 
absence of productivity concerns and discrimination an 
employer may not be willing to hire older workers as the 
payment scheme does not motivate them. Both theoretical 
and empirical analyses have shown that deferred compen-
sation can make an employer reluctant to hire older work-
ers. At its most simple deferred compensation means that 
employers design compensation systems such that workers’ 
wages are increasing in the tenure with their employer inde-
pendent of worker productivity gains. Workers accumulate 
quasi-rents in the course of the employment relationship. 
These quasi rents are paid back late in their tenure with the 
employer. This pay back can come in the form of increasing 
tenure-wage profiles or employer-provided pensions that 
are clearly deferred due to vesting and the nature of defined 
benefit formulae (Lazear 1990).
5.1  Theoretical background
From a theoretical viewpoint, deferred compensation may 
result for two reasons. First, and more traditionally, firm-
specific training plays a role (Hutchens 1988). Jobs entail-
ing firm-specific training impose fixed costs to the firm that 
are minimized by hiring younger workers and thus hiring 
infrequently (Oi 1963). The consequence of specific train-
It might be thought that laws against age discrimination 
would improve the hiring of older workers but there is little 
evidence in favor of this. Adams (2004) uses the state varia-
tion in anti-discrimination laws in the US to demonstrate 
that such laws increase employment among individuals in 
the protected age ranges. Yet, he finds employment declines 
among older workers above the age ranges protected by law. 
Most critically, the improved employment in the protected 
age ranges comes from a decrease in separation among 
these workers. They remain with their employer longer and 
are less likely to be fired or retire. Adams shows there is 
“simply no evidence” that older workers are more likely to 
be hired as a result of the legislation. Thus, the age discrimi-
nation laws seem to have improved the position of those 
employed but not helped those older workers seeking work. 
Viewed this way the laws may reinforce the tendency of 
employers to employ older workers but not hire them. Thus, 
it seems possible that the failure to hire older workers may 
reflect discrimination that is not eliminated by typical legal 
prohibitions.4
Discrimination can be either preference-based discrimi-
nation (Becker 1957) or statistical discrimination (Aigner 
and Cain 1977). Given that econometric studies have failed 
to provide clear evidence of a lower productivity of older 
workers, one might argue that statistical discrimination 
should play little or no role in the hiring of older workers. 
However, while older workers in general may be essentially 
as productive as younger workers, the variation in pro-
ductivity levels may be higher for older than for younger 
workers (Heyma et al. 2014). This may make risk averse 
employers reluctant to hire older applicants. Moreover, even 
though older workers in general may have no productivity 
disadvantage, unemployed older workers who seek a job 
may remain on average less productive.
A theoretical model by Manger (2013) captures this lat-
ter idea. In the model, workers differ in their productivity, 
but individual productivity does not depend on age. Work-
ers are matched to firms whereby the individual productivi-
ties of workers can only be observed after they have been 
hired. Firms fire unproductive workers and retain produc-
tive workers as long as possible. The probability that an 
imperfect matching process has sorted workers according 
to their productivity into the correct employment status 
increases with individual age. Thus, the older a productive 
worker, the higher the probability that he or she has already 
been matched to a good firm. Younger workers may be sim-
ply unemployed because they have not yet found a good 
4 Lahey (2008) presents evidence going even further. She contends 
that in states with aggressive enforcement of age discrimination laws, 
“firms seek to avoid litigation through means not intended by the legis-
lation—by not employing older workers in the first place.” She shows 
that the hiring of older workers becomes significantly less common in 
the face of strict enforcement of such laws.
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overcome the commitment problem. We will return to this 
issue when discussing policy implications in Sect. 6.
5.2  International evidence
Both theories have received substantial testing starting with 
studies for the United States. Hutchens (1986) computes an 
index of older employees’ hiring opportunities for occupa-
tion and industry cells in the US. This hiring opportunity 
index correlates negatively with three indicators of deferred 
compensation, namely tenure, pension provision, and man-
datory retirement. Scott et al. (1995) emphasize that health 
insurance in the US represents deferred compensation. They 
find that firms providing health insurance hire a smaller share 
of older workers. Hirsch et al. (2000) show that the hiring 
opportunities of US workers age 50 and older are reduced in 
occupations with steep wage profiles and pension benefits. 
Hu (2003) examines US individual data showing a negative 
relationship between training costs and the age at hire.
Evidence based on data from other countries largely 
matches that based on data from the US. Mazerolle and 
Singh (1999) use Canadian data to show that older work-
ers hired after a plant closure are unlikely to have jobs 
with “career growth”, a finding consistent with the role 
of deferred compensation within an internal labor market. 
Heywood et al. (1999) demonstrate that older workers in 
Hong Kong face reduced hiring opportunity when the firm 
provides a pension, has a well developed internal labor mar-
ket and has high average tenure. This is combined with evi-
dence that older workers are less likely to be hired when 
jobs require considerable skill investment. Daniel and Hey-
wood (2007) use UK establishment data confirming that the 
hiring of older workers is reduced by pensions, steep wage 
profiles and internal labor markets and that longer training 
time also reduces the probability of hiring older workers. In 
addition, Adams and Heywood (2007) use Australian estab-
lishment data to confirm that steeper tenure-wage profiles 
reduce the age of new hires.
Taken together, the international studies show a remark-
ably consistent pattern of results. In each of the countries 
examined deferred compensation has the predicted influ-
ence on the employment and hiring of older workers. This 
gives rise to the questions of how prevalent deferred com-
pensation is and of its effectiveness in motivating workers 
to provide effort. The answers to these questions are cru-
cial as they yield further insights into the significance of 
deferred compensation for the labor market prospects of 
older workers.
Examining a large Chinese textile operation, Dong et al. 
(2007) test the extent of deferred compensation by contrast-
ing the rate of increase in earnings with tenure and in worker 
ing is an upward-sloping earnings profile, reflecting that 
workers share both the cost of training and the later return 
on this investment (Becker 1964). Thus, firms offering spe-
cific training should have workers with longer tenure and 
provide reduced hiring opportunities for older workers.
Second, firms alleviate monitoring problems and 
improve incentives by using delayed compensation schemes 
(Lazear 1979, 1981). Hutchens (1986, 1988, 1993) modeled 
a workplace in which fear of losing delayed compensation 
deters worker shirking, increases productivity and generates 
long-term employment relationships. In this view the firm 
does not hire older workers because their shorter employ-
ment horizon means they are less well motivated by delayed 
compensation.5
In the appendix, we present a simple theoretical illus-
tration. A two-period efficiency wage model shows that 
an employer using deferred compensation prefers to hire 
younger workers. The employer can design two types of 
labor contracts. On the one hand, the employer can sign 
spot contracts with the workers each period. In this case, the 
employer pays the same efficiency wage in the first and in 
the second period to deter shirking. On the other hand, the 
employer can sign life cycle contracts with the workers, hire 
them in the first period and promise employment security 
for the two periods as long they are not caught shirking. 
The wage of the second period is the usual efficiency wage 
but, compared to the spot market contract, the employer can 
lower the first-period wage. Under the life cycle contract, 
the prospect of the second-period efficiency wage motivates 
workers to exert effort in the first period. Thus, the employer 
reduces labour costs by offering a life cycle contract. The 
incentive effect of the contract is greater if workers have a 
high probability of staying in the labor force in the second 
period. As this probability is higher for younger than for 
older workers, employers using life cycle contracts prefers 
to hire younger workers.
Building on Hutchen’s (1986) idea that employers may 
have an incentive to renege on life cycle contracts, we also 
extend the model to allow for overlapping generations. The 
employer may break the contracts by dismissing the current 
workers in the second period and replacing them with new 
hires who receive the lower entry wages.6 If workers antici-
pate this kind of employer opportunism, life cycle contracts 
lose their motivational effect. Thus, the effectiveness of life 
cycle contracts depends on the employer’s credibility that 
she is committed to the promise of employment security. 
Reputation concerns or worker representation may help 
5 Goldin (1986) makes a similar argument claiming that women are 
less well motivated by delayed compensation because of their lower 
expected tenure.
6 See Gokhale et al. (1995), Idson and Valetta (1996), Petersen (1992) 
and Valetta (1999) for empirical studies on employer default on 
deferred payment agreements.
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Huck et al. (2011) design classroom experiments to con-
trast a situation in which firm players have the ability to cred-
ibly commit to deferred incentives with a treatment in which 
they do not have this ability. While in the former many firms 
make use of the incentives and it works to increase effort, in 
the latter there is a very dramatic loss in efficiency as such 
arrangements break down. This contrast demonstrates to the 
authors “the success of the Lazear model—the difference 
deferred compensation makes (p. 842).” Macpherson et al. 
(2014) compare deferred compensation with an efficiency 
wage in classroom experiments. While their experimental 
results find support for both models, the deferred compensa-
tion model is more cost effective (as predicted by theory).
5.3  German evidence
Germany provides a particularly interesting case study. 
Compared to the US, workers in Germany have longer job 
tenure (Farber 1998; Harhoff 1998). Moreover, upward-
sloping earnings profiles appear to play an important role 
in Germany (OECD 2006; Zwick 2011). Furthermore, 
pensions voluntarily provided by the employers constitute 
one of the pillars (along with state pensions and individual 
savings) of the German retirement system (Schnabel and 
Wagner 1999). These employer provided pensions have 
been shown to reduce fluctuations in personnel (Rabe 
2005; Schnabel and Wagner 2001) and to increase worker 
engagement (Bossler 2015). Finally, even though the age 
structure of the workforce may have little influence on 
productivity, a higher share of older workers appears to 
be associated with reduced profitability of German firms 
(Pfeifer and Wagner 2014a). Altogether, these facts sug-
gest that deferred compensation plays an important role 
in the functioning of the labor market for older workers in 
Germany.
The German experience, indeed, conforms to the hypoth-
esis that deferred compensation reduces the willingness 
to hire older workers. Heywood et al. (2010) examine the 
roles of employer provided pensions and employee share 
ownership in the employment and hiring of older workers in 
Germany. Employee share ownership is typically designed 
to create long-term employee involvement in the firm, to 
retain skilled employees, and to protect the firm’s invest-
ment in firm-specific training.9 Employer provided pensions 
provide a particularly strong indicator of deferred compen-
sation in Germany. Maximum vesting at the time of the data 
was either 10 or 12 years depending on the worker’s age, far 
longer than in the U.S. (5 years) or the UK (2 years). More-
over, defined benefit plans, which typically grow faster later 
in tenure, dominate German pension provision. Thus, in 
9 See Robinson and Zhang (2005) for a detailed discussion on human 
capital investment and employee share ownership.
productivity within a firm.7 They confirm tenure wage pro-
files that increase far faster than the growth in productiv-
ity. This joins similar confirmations that use performance 
data from a large Dutch manufacturer (Dohmen 2004) and 
a large Italian firm (Flabbi and Ichino 2001). In each case 
there is a return to tenure independent of worker produc-
tivity. In addition, Fukao et al. (2006) examine matched 
employer-employee data from Japan demonstrating far 
steeper wage-tenure profiles than productivity-tenure pro-
files, again supporting the role of deferred compensation.8
Another strand of research compares the tenure-earning 
profiles across groups of workers. The idea is that the pro-
files should be steeper in situations where imperfect moni-
toring and asymmetric information make the use of deferred 
compensation necessary to motivate workers. Lazear and 
Moore (1984) compare independent contractors (in business 
for themselves) and employees doing the same job. They 
argue that the extent of deferred compensation can be exam-
ined by this comparison because the employer has an incen-
tive to rearrange the compensation for employees but that 
self-employment eliminates any reason to defer compensa-
tion. Indeed, the earnings profile of the employees emerges 
as much steeper supporting the presence of deferred com-
pensation for the employees. Kotlikoff and Gohkale (1992) 
compare sales workers with more nearly verifiable pro-
ductivity with their managers with less clearly verifiable 
productivity. The earnings profiles of the managers show 
greater deferred compensation with earnings below pro-
ductivity early in career and above productivity late in their 
career. The earnings of sales workers essentially match their 
productivity over their career.
There are also studies examining the incentive effects of 
deferred compensation directly. These studies confirm that 
deferred compensation can be a powerful incentive device. 
Adams and Heywood (2011) show that self-reported effort 
is higher in both the US and Australia when tenure-wage 
profiles are steeper. Moreover, in keeping with life-cycle 
incentives, this finding is generated almost exclusively by 
younger workers reporting greater effort when facing a 
steeper profile.
7 This harkens back to the original examination by Medoff and Abra-
ham (1980) but the current authors have particularly good (“objec-
tive”) measures of individual productivity.
8 We note that studies that examine wage-age and productivity-age pro-
files instead of wage-tenure and productivity-tenure profiles provide 
rather mixed evidence. Cataldi et al. (2011) confirm deferred compen-
sation in Belgium. They show that younger workers are paid below 
and older workers above their marginal productivity. Cardoso et al. 
(2011) find no evidence of deferred compensation for Portugal. The 
wages of younger workers increase in line with productivity while the 
wage increases lag behind productivity gains as prime-age approaches. 
Yet, age is only an incomplete proxy for tenure. Thus, it is more dif-
ficult to identify patterns of deferred compensation by examining age-
tenure and age-productivity profiles.
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with high quality when they are hired. Of course, some 
older workers may well desire part-time employment. They 
may see it as part of a phasing out of work. Nonetheless 
the basic point of Heywood et al.’s (2011) analysis is that 
deferred compensation may push older workers searching 
for employment also into involuntary part-time work.11
Finally, Pfeifer (2013) confirms that if older workers are 
hired, they are less likely to receive deferred compensation. 
His estimates suggest that wage-tenure profiles depend on 
the workers’ entry age. Firms pay higher entry wages and 
flatter wage-tenure profiles to older entrants. This finding 
also fits the notion that employers prefer to motivate older 
hires through contemporaneous incentives as there is less 
room for deferred compensation.
In sum, the use of deferred compensation helps explain 
the less dynamic labor market for older workers (low job exit 
and job entry rates) and, in particular, the severe difficulties 
they face in finding a new job. This gives rise to the question 
what types of firms use deferred payment schemes such as 
employer provided pensions and seniority wages. Schnabel 
and Wagner (1999) find that larger firms, older firms and 
those with a high share of white-collar workers are more 
likely to provide pensions. The share of female employ-
ees is a negative determinant. Zwick (2011) estimates the 
determinants of rewarding seniority. He shows that export 
activities, firm size and the qualification of the workforce 
are positive determinants while high entry wages, the share 
of foreigners and the share of female employees are nega-
tive determinants. Industrial relations play also a role. We 
will return to that role below.
6  Policy implications
6.1  Should the use of deferred compensation be 
discouraged?
The finding that deferred compensation hurts the hiring 
prospects for older workers raises the issue of possible 
policy initiatives. One might argue that the use of deferred 
compensation should be discouraged in order to increase 
the chance that unemployed older people find a new job. 
However, whether this improves the labor market prospects 
of older people in general is not clear. While firms with 
deferred compensation are on the one hand much less will-
ing to hire older workers, they employ on the other hand 
a higher share of older workers. Thus, a reduced use of 
deferred compensation may have a negative effect on the 
share of older workers employed by the firms.
11 Farber (1999) shows for the U.S. that job losers are more likely to be 
hired into involuntary part-time jobs.
Germany, most workers face real capital losses when leav-
ing pension covered jobs before retirement.10 Such losses 
represent foregone quasi-rents associated with deferred com-
pensation. Heywood et al. (2010) find that both employee 
share ownership and employer provided pensions are posi-
tive determinants of employing older workers and negative 
determinants of the willingness to hire older workers. Thus, 
firms retain older workers hired when they were younger but 
do not hire older workers. These findings fit the theoretical 
predictions. On the one hand, employers using deferred com-
pensation employ older workers who entered the firm at a 
younger age in order to enable them to capture the quasi rents 
they have created by their efforts. On the other hand, those 
employers are less willing to hire older workers as older new 
hires are less motivated by deferred compensation.
Zwick (2012b) provides corroborating evidence. He uses 
linked employer-employee data from Germany to calculate 
firm-specific seniority wage profiles. His estimates suggest 
that firms with seniority wage profiles steeper than the sec-
tor average keep their employees longer but hire fewer older 
employees. Instead, these firms tend to hire employees with 
little experience.
Moreover, Heywood et al. (2011) show for Germany that 
even if firms with deferred compensation hire older workers, 
they are more likely to hire them only for peripheral jobs. 
Among the employers that are willing to hire older work-
ers, those providing employee share ownership or pensions 
tend to hire older workers only for part-time jobs. Part-time 
jobs are a critical indicator of being out of the core internal 
labor market. Part-time employment more rapidly adjusts 
to demand changes than full-time employment. These more 
rapid adjustments are incompatible with the long expected 
tenure associated with deferred compensation. Moreover, 
skill requirements for part-time jobs are substantially lower 
than for full-time workers. Part-time jobs typically involve 
routine and repetitive tasks that require no long-term coop-
eration and facilitate direct monitoring so that the provision 
of incentives through deferred compensation may be not 
necessary (Hutchens 2001). Or put differently, firms with 
deferred compensation use this type of incentive scheme 
more likely for core jobs in the internal labor market but 
not for peripheral jobs. If they hire older workers, they only 
hire them for peripheral jobs as those jobs do not require 
deferred compensation to motivate workers.
Altogether, Heywood et al.’s (2011) findings imply that 
the disadvantage of older workers entailed by deferred com-
pensation is underestimated if the type of employment is 
not taken into account. Deferred compensation not only 
decreases the probability that older workers are hired. It 
also decreases the probability that they are hired for jobs 
10 See Rabe (2005) for a detailed discussion on employer provided pen-
sions in Germany.
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may be also important for a successful implementation of 
deferred compensation (Jirjahn 2009).
Deferred compensation presupposes that the employer 
promises employment security. Yet, the employer has an 
incentive to behave opportunistically and to dismiss work-
ers late in their tenure in order to capture their quasi-rents 
(see the appendix for a simple theoretical illustration). 
A works council may ensure that promises made are also 
kept. A series of studies have shown that works councils are 
specifically effective in increasing firm performance when 
the firm is covered by collective bargaining (Jirjahn 2014). 
In this case, distributional conflicts are moderated outside 
the firm so that works councils can specialize in the cre-
ation rather than in the redistribution of rents. Against this 
background it is interesting that Heywood et al. (2010) and 
Zwick (2012c) show that a combination of works council 
incidence and collective bargaining coverage has a particu-
larly strong influence on the use of deferred compensation. 
This indicates the influence of industrial relations on the use 
of deferred compensation is not primarily driven by rent 
seeking. It rather reflects the potential of industrial relations 
institutions to overcome market failures in the provision of 
appropriate incentives for workers.
Furthermore, one must take into account that the exten-
sive system of apprenticeship training in Germany may con-
tribute to the strong role of deferred compensation. Young 
people use the apprenticeship to enter internal labor mar-
kets that make further investment so firms can retain work-
ers after training (Soskice 1994; Harhoff and Kane 1997). 
This binds workers and firms suggesting longer tenure and 
reduced hiring of older workers.
Industrial relations influence the system of apprentice-
ship training. Kriechel et al. (2014) show that firms with 
a works council make a higher net investment in training. 
These firms are also more likely to retain workers after 
training. The share of former apprentices still employed 
with the same firm after 5 years is significantly higher if 
a works council is present. Confirming previous research, 
the authors find that the effects of works councils are more 
pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining 
agreements.
In conclusion, discouraging the use of deferred compen-
sation would imply that institutions that now contribute to 
economic performance in Germany would need to be sub-
stantially changed. These changes could be counterproduc-
tive and would entail ambiguous employment effects. The 
crucial question whether or not these institutions will still 
work in times of demographic change.
6.3  Learning from the Japanese experience
One must recognize that the labor market implications of 
deferred compensation schemes depend on how they are 
In the end, the crucial question is whether stabilizing the 
employment of older people who have a job or creating new 
opportunities for older people who have no job will be more 
helpful in times of demographic change. Boersch-Supan 
(2003) argues that population aging will change the struc-
ture of demand for goods involving substantial reallocation 
of employment across different sectors and, hence, result-
ing in an increased mobility of labor. This may indicate that 
also the labor market for older workers must become more 
dynamic in the future so that policy should put more weight 
on improving the labor market prospects of older people 
who seek for new jobs.
Of course, one may question whether there is even 
need for policy intervention. Firms choose the incentive 
schemes that maximize the present value of their expected 
profits. If a firm does not use deferred compensation, it has 
to rely on contemporaneous incentives to motivate work-
ers. For example, efficiency wages stand as an alternative 
to deferred compensation. Acemoglu and Newman (1997) 
show that providing incentives through deferred compen-
sation can be less costly than providing contemporaneous 
incentives through efficiency wages (also see Macpherson 
et. al 2014). Thus, if a policy intervention induces firms to 
switch from deferred compensation to contemporaneous 
incentives, this may result in increased labor costs implying 
a negative effect on the level of employment in general.
6.2  The role of institutional factors in Germany
It is important to recognize that while market-driven forces 
are important, institutional frameworks also influence the 
use of deferred compensation. Specifically, industrial rela-
tions have been shown to influence the use of deferred 
compensation. Industrial relations in Germany are charac-
terized by a dual structure of employee representation with 
both works councils and unions (Huebler and Jirjahn 2003). 
While works councils provide a highly developed mecha-
nism for codetermination at the firm level, unions typically 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements with employers’ 
associations on a broad industrial level. Zwick (2011) finds 
that the incidence of a works council in a firm and the cover-
age by a collective bargaining agreement increase the prob-
ability that the firm has a seniority wage profile steeper than 
the sector average.
At issue is whether the influence of industrial relations 
harms or improves economic welfare. On the one hand, 
one may argue that worker organizations foster internal 
labor markets over the course of their rent seeking activi-
ties (Addison and Siebert 1991). On the other hand, worker 
organization may help overcome market failures. Spe-
cifically, works councils may foster trust and cooperation 
within firms (Freeman and Lazear 1995; Smith 1991). This 
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in one country may not be able to be broken into parts are be 
successfully grafted into the institutions of another country.
7  Conclusions
We suggest that the continued lack of mobility and oppor-
tunity in the market of older workers reflects, in large part, 
the nature of life cycle contracts. Such contracts backload 
compensation to elicit loyalty, learning and effort from 
workers. While this may be efficient, it has as a consequence 
the tendency of firms to employ older workers but not hire 
them. The evidence of this seems clear both in Germany 
and in other countries. First, there is substantial evidence 
that such backloading of compensation exists. Second, it is 
nearly unanimous that in those circumstances with exten-
sive backloaded compensation, older workers are less likely 
to be hired.
More research is needed on the types of jobs in which 
older workers are actually hired. Heywood et al. (2011) 
have suggested a share of German employers will only hire 
older workers for part-time jobs. Is that also true for tem-
porary appointments? Can it also be confirmed that when 
hired for permanent jobs, older workers are less likely to 
be in career jobs with chances for significant advancement? 
Related to these questions are patterns of self-employment. 
The Japanese case is particularly interesting as workers fre-
quently retire from an employer, ending a life time career as 
an employee, but continue to work for the same employer as 
a self-employed contractor. It would be interesting to iden-
tify how common such practices are in Germany.
While some of the answers to these additional research 
questions remain outstanding, the need to address Ger-
man institutions and policies remains. We have argued that 
some of the institutions of the German labor market, works 
councils and apprenticeships in particular, interact with 
life-cycle contracting in a largely efficient fashion. Thus, 
attempts to discourage deferred compensation run the risk 
of generating substantial harms. Here again, the Japanese 
case remains intriguing as Japan also has significant deferred 
compensation that plays a critical role in motivation, learn-
ing and loyalty. The difference is the ease with which work-
ers in Japan can terminate their career and continue to work, 
largely without implicit penalty, at their current firm. It may 
be worth exploring if German pension regulation and struc-
ture can be modified to further facilitate alternative types of 
employment by older workers after their formal retirement.
Against this background, future research should also 
examine if there is a link between the possibility of early 
retirement and the use of deferred compensation. While 
early retirement is often thought to reduce the labor force 
participation of older workers, it may provide flexibility for 
firms and workers to determine the optimal length of life 
actually incorporated into the general HRM and retirement 
policy of firms. Viewed in this way, the experience of Japan 
may be useful. Larger Japanese firms are known for their 
extremely steep tenure wage structure in which wages seem-
ingly advance largely independent of variations in worker 
productivity growth (Fukao et al. 2006). This is combined 
with a strict and early mandatory retirement requirement 
(often at age 60) and extremely long job tenure at these 
same larger firms. These features are clearly recognizable 
from Lazear’s (1979) description of deferred compensation 
and have caused many to view Japan as a leading example 
of its implementation (Hart and Kawasaki 1999). From what 
has been described, one would anticipate poor labor market 
dynamics for older workers with the associated difficulties 
in getting hired. Yet, the reality is rather different.
Figure 1 indicates that the labor force participation rate 
of older Japanese is much higher and that it does not drop 
off as steeply with age when compared to Germany. Hey-
wood and Siebert (2009) suggest some of the reasons for the 
comparative Japanese success in retaining older workers. 
They argue that Japan has been highly successful in separat-
ing an initial labor market that uses internal labor markets 
and deferred compensation from a subsequent labor market 
that uses contemporaneous incentives and more nearly spot 
labor markets. This is facilitated by the common mandatory 
retirement age which is allowed because of the absence of 
US style age discrimination laws. Companies make large 
lump sum severance payments as employees leave at the 
end of their lifetime employment (typically at age 60). They 
then face the prospect of finding a new job but this is facili-
tated by employment protection laws that apply to regular 
work but not to temporary jobs (OECD 2004, p. 72). As a 
consequence, it is extremely common for workers to retire 
at age 60 but immediately sign a series of short-term tem-
porary contracts with either their original employer or with 
others.
Individuals in Japan who work till 65 receive a state pen-
sion but this is paid irrespective of whether they are work-
ing or not. This also helps separate the two sequential labor 
markets and means that the pension does not affect retire-
ment decisions. The consequence of this arrangement is that 
Japan has an extremely low implicit tax on continued work 
after age 65. Duval (2003) shows it may be 10 % or less and 
that it can be contrasted with, for example, France which 
has an implicit tax on continued worker of about 70 %. 
Thus, in Japan there are few disincentives for workers to 
continue in the labor market and few disincentives for firms 
to hire older workers.
As is always true in international comparisons, it is 
unclear whether specific elements of any country’s employ-
ment relations system can be moved in parts over to another 
country. The set of interlocking institutions that to succeed 
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8  Executive summary
Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den 
Arbeitsmarkt für ältere Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland. In 
einer international vergleichenden Perspektive werden ins-
besondere die Bedingungen analysiert, die einen Einfluss 
auf die Entscheidungen von Arbeitgebern ausüben, ältere 
Arbeitnehmer zu beschäftigen und neu einzustellen. Aus-
gangspunkt der Überlegungen ist, dass Ältere, die arbeitslos 
werden, nach wie vor geringe Chancen haben, eine neue 
Stelle zu finden. D. h., trotz einer erhöhten Erwerbsbeteili-
gung Älterer weist der Arbeitsmarkt für Ältere weiterhin 
eine sehr geringe Dynamik auf.
Eine naheliegende Erklärung könnte sein, dass dies mit 
einer geringeren Produktivität älterer Arbeitnehmer zusam-
menhängt. Vorliegende empirische Studien liefern hier 
jedoch ausgesprochen heterogene Ergebnisse. Ein weiterer 
Grund könnte darin bestehen, dass Ältere am Arbeitsmarkt 
diskriminiert werden. Hierfür gibt es durchaus Evidenz. 
Allerdings ist fraglich, ob sich die schlechteren Arbeits-
marktchancen älterer Arbeitsloser allein auf Diskriminier-
ung zurückführen lassen.
Eine dritte Erklärung besagt, dass vielmehr die Anreize, 
die Arbeitgeber einsetzen, um Mitarbeiter zur Leistungs-
erbringungen zu motivieren, eine wichtige Rolle spielen. 
Ein Weg zur Motivation von Mitarbeitern ist der Ein-
satz von Formen zeitlich verzögerter Vergütung wie z.B. 
Senioritätsentlohnung oder betriebliche Altersversor-
gung (Hutchens 1986; Lazear 1979). Zeitlich verzögerte 
Vergütung eignet sich jedoch nicht, neu eingestellte Arbe-
itnehmer zu motivieren, die nur über einen kürzeren erwar-
teten Beschäftigungshorizont verfügen. Daher präferieren 
Arbeitgeber, die dieses Motivationsinstrument nutzen, bei 
Neueinstellungen tendenziell eher jüngere und keine 
älteren Bewerber. Empirische Studien belegen nicht nur, 
dass zeitlich verzögerte Vergütungsformen in der Tat ein 
wichtiges Anreizinstrument darstellen. Sie zeigen zudem, 
dass dieses Anreizinstrument erhebliche Konsequenzen für 
die Arbeitsmarktchancen älterer Arbeitnehmer hat. Zwar 
beschäftigen Arbeitgeber mit zeitlich verzögerten Vergüt-
ungsformen einen höheren Anteil älterer Arbeitnehmer. Sie 
sind zugleich aber zurückhaltend bei der Neueinstellung 
Älterer. Bemerkenswert ist, dass es sich hierbei um einen 
sehr einheitlichen Befund handelt, der sich nicht nur für 
Deutschland, sondern auch für eine Reihe anderer Industri-
estaaten nachweisen lässt.
Wir verweisen darauf, dass es eher fraglich erscheint, die 
Arbeitsmarktchancen Älterer dadurch verbessern zu wol-
len, indem man Arbeitgeber zur Abschaffung zeitlich ver-
zögerter Vergütungsformen bewegt. Bei zeitlich verzögerter 
Vergütung handelt es sich um ein sehr effektives Anreizin-
strument, das sich für viele Arbeitgeber von Vorteil erweist. 
Gleichwohl können die Arbeitsmarktchancen Älterer auch 
cycle contracts. As industrial relations also influence the 
firms’ use of early retirement programs (Bellmann and Janik 
2010), it would be interesting to examine their specific role 
in the possible link between early retirement and deferred 
compensation.
Furthermore, we note that active labor market policy 
can play an important role in the hiring situation of older 
employees. Older job seekers often apply for the wrong 
jobs (Bellmann and Brussig 2007). Such mismatch may be 
reduced by job search assistance and intensified counseling 
(Boockmann and Brändle 2015). One dimension of improv-
ing job search would be to discourage older workers from 
applying for jobs with deferred compensation and to help 
older workers find jobs with contemporaneous incentives.
We recognize that the future of deferred compensation 
depends on changes in the nature of production. On the one 
hand, new technologies may entail improvements in the 
monitoring of worker performance. This could reduce the 
need to provide strong incentives through deferred com-
pensation. On the other hand, there appears to be a reorga-
nization of work toward more complex and multi-faceted 
jobs. This may make monitoring more difficult and, thus, 
requires an increased use of deferred compensation to moti-
vate workers.
We also recognize that the future of deferred compen-
sation depends on changes in industrial relations (Addi-
son et al. 2013). For many years, the collective bargaining 
coverage and the prevalence of works councils have been 
decreasing. This may result in a declining use of deferred 
compensation.
Finally, we note that demographic change is likely to have 
implications for firms’ future use of life-cycle contracts. An 
aging population may change the demand for goods result-
ing in an increased reallocation of jobs. This could make 
it more difficult for firms to provide life-cycle contracts to 
employees. As a consequence, the labor market for older 
workers may become more dynamic in the future. Further-
more, demographic change may imply that firms will face 
increased difficulties in filling their vacancies. These dif-
ficulties may be a particularly severe in Germany which 
faces a large decrease in its natural working-age population. 
This will have ambiguous consequences for the use of life-
cycle contracts. On the one hand, firms may increasingly 
rely on those contracts to retain workers so that they have a 
smaller number of vacancies to fill. On the hand, firms may 
increasingly substitute contemporaneous incentives for life-
cycle contracts and so fill their vacancies with older hires. 
We conclude then by recognizing that the implications of 
demographic change for the use of incentives and so for the 
hiring and employment policies of older workers stand as 
important future research.
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period is the last period, the no-shirking condition is the 
same as in Eq. (2):
 (4)
When choosing effort in the first period, the worker recog-
nizes that this decision also influences utility in the second 
period. The no-shirking condition of the first period is:
 
(5)
The left hand side shows the worker’s expected utility if 
he exerts effort and consists of the current utility plus the 
expected utility of the second period. In the second period, 
the worker stays in the labor force with probability . The 
right hand side is the expected utility if the worker shirks. 
With probability  the worker is not detected and contin-
ues to work for the employer. With probability  the worker 
is caught and loses the job for both periods receiving the 
alternative utility.
From (4) and (5), we obtain the first-period wage of the 
life cycle contract:
 (6)
Thus, the worker’s wage increases with tenure: 
 Moreover, the first-period wage of the 
life cycle contract is smaller than the spot market wage: 
. The reason is that the life cycle contract 
is more effective in deterring shirking than the spot con-
tract. If the worker is caught shirking in the first period, he 
loses both the current wage and the higher second period 
wage. The employer provides incentives at lower cost using 
deferred compensation.
Critical in our context, the first-period wage of the life 
cycle contract decreases in the probability that the worker 
remains in the labor force in the second period:
 (7)
A higher probability of remaining means that the higher sec-
ond-period wage is more effective in deterring the worker 
from shirking in the first period. Hence, the necessity to pro-
vide incentives through a high first-period wage decreases. 
Thus, as , the first-period wage is lower for a 
younger than for an older worker. Taking into account that 
according to Eq. (4) the second-period wage is the same 
for both types of workers, this has two crucial implica-
tions. First, the wage-tenure profile is steeper for a younger 
worker than it would be for an older worker. Second, the 
bei intensiver Nutzung von zeitlich verzögerter Entlohnung 
durch eine geeignete Ausgestaltung verbessert werden. Dies 
zeigt insbesondere auch die japanische Erfahrung.
 Appendix: A Simple Theoretical Illustration
A.1 Deferred Compensation and Older Workers
We model deferred compensation within an efficiency 
wage framework. Consider an employer living for two 
periods (t = 1,2) and requiring one worker each period. The 
pool of potential workers consists of older and younger 
workers. Let  denote the probabil-
ity that a worker remains in the labor force in the second 
period:  Workers have identical utility 
functions:
 (1)
where  is the wage in period t,  the effort in t, 
and  the disutility of effort, c > 0. Each worker’s alter-
native utility is  when in the labor force. When 
out of the labor force, utility is normalized to zero. Produc-
tion requires that the worker exert effort ( ). However, 
effort cannot be perfectly monitored and if the worker shirks 
), it is detected with probability ,
The employer can design two types of labor contracts. 
One possibility is that the employer signs a spot contract 
with a worker each period. A spot contract lasts one period 
so that there are two spot contracts. The employer may sign 
two successive spot contracts with the same worker or she 
may hire different workers in the first and in the second 
period. Each spot contract pays  as long as the worker 
is not caught shirking. If the worker is caught shirking, the 
employer dismisses him without paying the wage and the 
worker receives the alternative utility . The employer sets 
the wage in such a way that the worker has no incentive to 
shirk. This is reflected by the no-shirking condition:
 (2)
The utility from effort must be at least as high as the 
expected utility from shirking. Equation (2) implies that the 
spot wage is the same each period:
 (3)
The second possibility is a life cycle contract with deferred 
compensation. The employer hires a worker in the first 
period and promises employment security for the two peri-
ods as long as the worker is not caught shirking. The life 
cycle contract specifies a wage  for the first period 
and a wage  for the second period. As the second 
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 (11)
This wage also holds for life cycle contracts offered to 
subsequent generations. Comparing Eqs. (8) and (11) 
it follows that the first-period wage is higher if there is 
the possibility of employer opportunism in the second 
period: w ̃1deferred >w1deferred. Moreover, the first-period wage is 
increasing in the probability of employer opportunism:
 (12)
Thus, the higher the probability of employer opportunism 
the flatter is the tenure-wage profile. Or put differently, 
deferred compensation is more pronounced in situations 
with a low probability that the employer reneges on her 
promise of employment security.
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